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ABSTRACT
For the elderly, housing choices are more complex than merely the
choice of housing expenditure, dwelling size, and tenure. They also in-
clude the choice among alternative living arrangements such as living in
one household with their adult children or sharing accomodations with other
related or unrelated elderly.
We first contrast living arrangements of elderly Americans with the
population under age 65 and describe the changes from 1974 to 1983. We
detect a growing discrepancy in household formation/dissolution patterns
between the elderly and the younger population: after a steady decline in
the 1970s, we observe a rapid increase in the rate of "doubled-up" young
families in the beginning of the 1980s. No such development can be found
among elderly Americans. Instead, the proportion of elderly living in-
dependently steadily increases from 1974 to 1983.
To explain this discrepancy, we estimate a multinomial choice model
among living independently and six categories of alternative living ar-
rangements. The main finding is the predominance of demographic
determinants as opposed to economic variables. The difference in income
growth between the young and the elderly -- realincome declined for the
young but increased for the elderly -- canexplain only part of the dis-
crepancy in household dissolution decisions. The remaining discrepancy
must be attributed to inertia and low mobility rates.
Axel Borsch-Supan
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass. 021381. Introduction1
A significant segment of the housing market is governed by choices
and decisions made by the elderly. The importance of this segment will
be even greater in the future because the share of elderly Americans in
the total population will be steadily increasing. For elderly, housing
choices are more complex than the choice of housing expenditure, dwell-
ing size, tenure, etc. of their owndwelling.in particular for older
elderly, a potential alternative to living independently is to live in
one household with their adult children or to share accommodations with
other elderly. The decision to dissolve the household, and the conse-
quent choice of living arrangements, is the focus of this paper.
The choice of living arrangements is an important aspect of the
well-being of the elderly and the economics of aging because of its
side-effects in the provision of care and the physical environment that
this choice implies. Sharing accommodations, in particular with adult
children, will not only provide housing but also some degree of medical
care and social support for the elderly. If elderly persons perceive
sharing accommodations as an inferior housing alternative and remain
living independently as long as their physical and economic means allow,
this social support and a larger amount of medical care have to be
picked up by society at large rather than the family or close friends.
1Mike Tamada and Winston Lin provided valuable research assistance.
I appreciated helpful comments by John Quigley and Angus Deaton. Finan-
cial support was received from the National Institutes of Health, In-
stitute on Aging, Grant #l-POl-AG05842-Ol.-2-
Household dissolution decisions also have obvious consequences for
the intergenerational distribution of housing. In particular in times
of tight housing market conditions with very high housing prices for
newly developed units, the elderly's willingness to move out of the
family home is an important parameter in the supply of more affordable
existing homes. There is also the subtle question of intergenerational
equity when elderly are perceived as being "overhoused," that is,live
in houses that are relatively more spacious than those of younger
families with children.
This paper studies the economic and demographic determinants of the
elderly's decision to stay living independently or to choose some kind
of shared accommodations. The main questions being asked are:
-Howmany elderly live independently? Does this percentageexhibit
a similar development as in the non-elderly population?
-Whoare the elderly living independently? Are they younger, are
they wealthier?
-Howmany elderly live with their children? If so,do they head the
household, or are they "received" by their children?
-Howmany distantly related and unrelated elderly shareaccommoda-
tions?-3-
-Areeconomic conditions (income, housing prices) important
determinants for the choice between living independently or sharing
accommodations? Or is the decision to give up an independent
household simply determined by age and health?
-Doonly the less wealthy and older elderly "seek refuge" in their
childrens' homes?
-Whoarethe "hosts" for subfamilies? Do they tend to be richer
(because they can afford supplying extra shelter) or do they tend
to be poorer (because they cannot afford privacy)?
The paper is organized in three parts. We first contrast living
arrangements of elderly Americans with the population under the age of
65 years, describe the changes from 1974 to 1983, and compare housing
choices in SMSAs with those in non-metropolitan areas and study regional
variations. Our main result in this descriptive analysis is the dis-
crepancy of the trends household formation/dissolution between the
elderly and the younger population: after a steady decline in the 1970s,
we observe a rapid increase in the rate of "doubled-up" young families
in the beginning of the 1980s. No such development can be found among
elderly Americans. The proportion of elderly living independently
steadily increases in our sample period from 1974 to 1983.
In the second part, we estimate a formal choice model among living
independently and six categories of alternative living arrangements.
The main finding is the predominance of demographic determinants is op-
posed to economic explanations. This is not too surprising, but some--4-
what frustrating for an economist. To our relief, the data indicates a
growing importance of income in this choice. We also discover a strik-
ing difference in the importance of income between the poor elderly and
the well-to-do.
Finally, we employ these estimation results to explain the dis-
crepancy in the development of household formation/dissolution between
the young and the elderly.
2. Data and Household Decomtosition
Our analysis is based on the Linked National Sample 1974 to 1983 of
the Annual Housing Survey, now called American Housing Survey (MIS).
Our primary reason for employing the Al-IS is its very large sample size
that allows us to make inferences about infrequent choices and to con-
duct subgroup analyses. The careful recording of household composition
makes it possible to detect elderly living as subfamilies or as
"secondary individuals" in households headed by their children or other
younger persons. Another important advantage of the AilS for the study
of housing decisions is its inclusion of structural housing charac-
teristics that allow a precise definition of housing prices. Data sets
such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and the Retirement
History Survey (RHS) allow only the construction of simple expenditure
measures uncorrected for quality differences.
However, it should be pointed out that the Annual Housing Survey
has also several severe shortcomings. Though the dwelling units are-5-
linked over time, the households or individuals living in these units
are not. This prevents any dynamic analysis without stringent assunip-
tions on the transition probabilities. The analysis in this paper is
strictly cross-sectional and static, a limited dynamic version of the
model in the second part of this paper is the subject of a sequel to
this paper. The ABS does not contain a systematic record of the func-
tional health status of the elderly.2 We will depend on age as an in-
dicator also for health, relying on the fact that age-specific medical
cost and hospitalization patterns have been relatively stable for the
last two decades.3 Finally, the ABS includes all elderly that live in
regular housing units but not the institutionalized population. Hence
the choice among alternative living arrangements excludes the choice of
the continuum between congregate housing and nursing homes, alternatives
that are becoming increasingly popular.4
Therefore, most housing data is collected on a household level,
with much information about individual household members subsumed in a
household total. This is the case in the Census, to some degree in the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and in the Annual Housing Survey.
However, once one realizes that many elderly do not live independently,
and that the choice between living independently and sharing accommoda-
tions is an important decision, one must view households as an outcome
of such decisions rather than an exogenously given sampling unit. If
2The 1978 National Sample contains a supplement on disabilities.
3See Poterba and Summers (1985).
4The ABS can be augmented with data from the National Nursing Home
Survey. This is a subject for further research.-6-
the alternative living arrangements are endogenous, the primary decision
unit in housing choice analysis must be smaller than the household, and
a fairly narrow definition of a family is more appropriate. A suitable
decision unit is the (family-) nucleus, defined as follows:
Definition (Nucleus):
A nucleus consists of a married couple or a single individual with all
their own children below age 18.
Households are formed as an outcome of living arrangement decisions made
by individual nuclei. In many cases, the household is formed by only
one nucleus. Typical examples of multi-nuclei-households are elderly
parents in the household of their children, adult children still living
in the household of their parents, or roommates. We can distinguish
four types of households:
(1) Households consisting of only one nucleus,
(2) Households composed of nuclei with family relations (in this
household type, child-parent relationships are of particular
interest),
(3) Households composed of nuclei without family relations,
(4) Complex households, that is a combination of the latter two
types.-7-
Therefore, our first step in analyzing the data is to create a
database in which the appropriate decision unit, the nucleus, is the
sampling unit. This is achieved by detecting elderly subfamilies in ex-
isting households and splitting up households of type (2) through (4)
into several nuclei. This household decomposition is based on the
demographic and financial information on individual household members
available in the Annual Housing Survey. Variables like income, nucleus
size, etc. are apportioned accordingly.5
Our analysis will be based on 19,154 elderly nuclei. A nucleus is
considered elderly if at least one person in the nucleus is above the
age of 65 years. For some comparison, we also use a "control sample" of
19,938 younger nuclei. These samples were drawn as follows. The
original Annual Housing Survey database consists of dwellings that are
tracked through nine cross-sections from 1974 through 1983 (with the ex-
ception of 1982). First, we systematically sampled every fourth dwell-
ing from the original AHS. Of those, every dwelling in which at least
one elderly person lived was sampled, and every fourth of the remaining
dwellings. We then decomposed each household according to the above
rules into nuclei -- cross-sectionby cross-section.
As was already mentioned, this analysis does not attempt to track
individual nuclei over time. Because the ARS cross-sections are linked
across time by dwelling only, households will appear and vanish in the
5The creation of this data base is a large, mostly mechanical task
that is not particularly glamorous but devoured most of the work for
this paper.-8-
sample whenever they move. Hence, only a panel of stayer households
could be constructed. Tracking nuclei over time introduces additional
difficulties because nuclei must be identified in each cross-section and
then be matched over time. This matching is non-trivial because of
demographic changes (death or institutionalization) that are confounded
by the frequent occurrence of unreliable demographic data. Because we
treat observations of the same nucleus in separate years as independent
observations, the above 19,154 nuclei should more precisely be termed
"nucleus..years." We estimate that the elderly sample contains ap-
proximately 5,000 different nuclei.
3. Living Arrangements
We will describe the choice of an elderly nucleus among the follow-
ing seven types of living arrangements:
-Livingindependently (denoted by INDEP),
-Parentsliving in one household with their adult children either as
head of this joint household (denoted by PARE-H) or as subfamily in
the household headed by the adult child (denoted by PARE-S),
-Livingwith relatives other than adult children either as head of this
joint household (denoted by DREL-H) or as subfamily in the household
headed by the distant relative (denoted by DREL-S),-9-
-Livingwith unrelated persons either as head of this joint household
(denoted by NREL-H) or as subfamily in the household headed by the
non-relative (denoted by NREL-S).6
These seven types of living arrangements for the elderly are
depicted in Figure 1. Note that for elderly who do not live indepen-
dently we distinguish not only among three different relations to the
other household members (PARE, DREL, NREL), but also between two
headship categories (IIEAD and UBF). This is important because elderly
who dissolve their own household in order to live in their adult
childrens' household are living in an entirely different situation than
elderly who stay in their family home but provide shelter for some of
their adult children. In the first case, an explicit decision to move
and to dissolve the elderly's household has to be made, and the elderly
person gives up the economically important function as a homeowner (or,
more rarely, as a renter) to become a sublettee. In the second case,
the elderly person avoids the important psychic and physical moving
costs and keeps the status as homeowner.
For the younger nuclei, two additional living arrangements become
relevant:
-Adultchildren living in one household with their parents either as
head of this joint household (denoted by CHIL_H) or as subfamily in
the household headed by the parent (denoted by CHIL-S).
6Complex households are assigned to the above categories in the
stated order.-10-
Table 1 presents the proportions in which these living arrangements
are chosen by the elderly. The data is once stratified by year of
cross-section (1974 through 1983, with the exception of 1982), by the
four census regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West), and by
whether the dwelling is located in an SMSA or a non-metropolitan area.
For comparison, Table 2 presents the same proportions for younger
nuclei. Based on more than 19,000 observations, the entries have a
standard deviation of less than .36 percent points.
More than two-third of all elderly nuclei live independently, that
is either as a married couple or as a single person forming a household.
This proportion increases steadily from 1974 to 1983. More detailed
tabulations show that about 32.5 percent of all elderly nuclei are
elderly living together with their spouses, and about 38.5 percent
elderly living alone. Almost all of the increase in independent elderly
nuclei is generated by an increase in the single-person nuclei. A con-
tinuation of this trend will have serious consequences in the delivery
of health care and social support because elderly seem to become in-
creasingly isolated and detached from their traditional source of medi-
cal and social support.
The percentage of elderly living independently is highest in the
western and midwestern region of the United States, lowest in the
Northeast, and is much higher in rural areas as compared to metropolitan
areas. The latter result is surprising and in contrast to common
beliefs about rural and non-rural living arrangements.-11-
The growing number of independent nuclei is particularly sig-
nificant because it is not typical for the population at large. Compar-
ing the trend among elderly nuclei with the development among younger
nuclei (first column in Tables 1 and 2) yields a striking result: there
is a large discrepancy in the development of household formation and
dissolution between the elderly and the young. Whereas the percentage
of all elderly nuclei living independently rises from 69.3 percent in
1974 to 73.0 percent in 1983, the percentage of nuclei in the younger
part of the population that lives independently fluctuates around 55
percent throughout the second half of the seventies, and then markedly
declines to 52.4 percent in 1983.
How does this discrepancy come about? In particular, why is there
no increase in alternative living arrangements in the early eighties?
This question will be the focus of the balance of this paper. Before
discussing potential explanations, we will analyse the importance of the
six dependent living arrangements.
Living together with one's own adult children is the most important
alternative living arrangement. Of the 28.9 percent of those elderly
nuclei who share accommodations with other nuclei, about 60 percent live
in the same households as their adult children do. In most of theses
cases, the elderly nucleus is household head, not the adult child. Cor-
responding to the increasing proportion of elderly living independently
(in particular alone), parent-child households decline as alternative
living arrangements. However, the relative importance of being head or
subfamily in an elderly parent-adult child household shifts dramatically
(columns PARE-H and PARE-S): in 1974, about 64 percent of all elderly-12-
parent-adult child were headed by the elderly, in 1983, more than 73
percent. The percentage of parent-child nuclei is lower in the Middle-
West and the West of the United States, and markedly lower in non-
metropolitan areas as compared to SMSAs.
The third and fourth column in Table 2 (labelled CHIL-H and CHIL-S)
represent the mirror image of elderly parent-adult child households, now
relative to the living arrangements chosen by younger nuclei. Column
three displays again the decline in headship-rates of adult children in
parent-children households. Note that the proportion of both elderly
parent-adult child living arrangements among all living arrangements
chosen by younger nuclei households stays approximately constant as op-
posed to the relative decline of this choice among elderly nuclei --
reflectingthe changing age distribution in the United States towards a
higher proportion of elder Americans and a relatively declining "supply"
for joint households.
About 8.7 percent of all elderly nuclei live doubled-up with
relatives other than their own children (categories DREL-H and DREL-S).
This percentage exhibits a similar declining trend as parent-child
households, from 9.8 percent in 1974 to 7.4 percent in 1983. Again,
this trend is in striking contrast to the younger population in which
the relative share of this kind of living arrangement increases from 7.0
percent in 1974 to 9.6 percent in 1983.
Only a very small percentage of elderly nuclei (3.0 percent) share
the household with non-related household members (living arrangements
NREL-H and NREL-S in Tables 1 and 2). This percentage is more or less-13-
stable in 1974-83 and is slightly lower than the corresponding per-
centage in younger households (3.4 percent) where we observe a distinct
increase from about 2.5 percent in 1974-76 to about 4.5 percent in the
early eighties.
4. Determinants of Living Arrangements
Who are the nuclei who live alone and who are the nuclei who share
accommodations? In this section, we will collect descriptive statistics
of the most important financial and demographic characteristics by
living arrangement: income, age, marital status, sex, and size of the
nucleus. These variables, among others, will influence the demand for
housing of each nucleus where housing choices are understood to also in-
clude the way in which accommodations are shared with other nuclei. In
the case of shared accommodations, these variable will also influence
the "supply" of living arrangements by the head nuclei. Short of
formulating some kind of demand-supply relationship of household
formulation,7 we will display some of these variables not only by
nucleus (as a determinant of demand), but also by each nucleus' respec-
tive head nucleus (as a determinant of supply).
We will first concentrate on demand. Tables 3 and 4 tabulates the
income of each nucleus. Average nucleus income for elderly is $11,150
compared to $15,450 for non-elderly nuclei. (These dollar amounts cor-
respond to 1980 figures, and are deflated with the consumer price
7See Becker's (1981) treatise or the paper by Ermisch (1981).-14-
index.) The respective household incomes are $14,100 for the elderly
population and $22,450 for the non-elderly. 87 percent of the income of
the non-elderly is transfer income; in turn, 80.1 percent of non-elderly
nuclei earn salary or wages as their predominant income source.
The row averages in the last columns of tables 3 and 4 indicate the
income development from 1974 to 1983. Real income of elderly nuclei
went almost steadily up from $10,470 to $12,340, essentially due to
doubly-indexed transfer income. This is in stark contrast to the
general real income development. Real income of non-elderly nuclei es-
sentially stayed constant in our sample period -- itincreased from 1974
to 1979, then decreased rapidly back to the 1974 level. If household
formation is income elastic, the diverging income distribution is a
formidable explanation for the discrepancy in household formation trends
between the young and the elderly. The choice model in Section 5 will
try to estimate this elasticity.
The intergenerational income distribution exhibits also some in-
teresting regional variation: for both elderly and non-elderly, income
is highest in the West and higher in urban than in non-metropolitan
areas. In the North East where income of young nuclei is below the na-
tional average, elderly nuclei receive an above average real income.
Not surprisingly, there is a large income gap between nuclei living
as head, and nuclei living as subfamilies. Head nuclei earn generally
about more than twice as much as subfamilies.However, this difference
in income between subfamilies and head nuclei is less pronounced than
among younger nuclei (Table 4). Headship clearly has a strongly posi--15-
tive income elasticity. Among younger nuclei, nuclei living in any kind
of shared accommodations have lower incomes than nuclei living indepen-
dently. Not only headship, but also living independently has a positive
income elasticity for younger nuclei. This is not necessarily the case
with elderly nuclei. Elderly parents who head a joint household with
their adult children exhibit larger average incomes than those living
independently, and their income rose dramatically from 1974 to 1983.
Hence, we observe not only an increasing share of elderly who live as
heads of two-generation households (Table 1), but also that these elder-
ly are very different from the nuclei we would expect are most likely to
"double-up."
The above observation may be attributable to the demand for or the
supply of shared housing opportunities. The stratification by region
and urbanization in Table 3 may yield some clues to separate demand from
supply: in Metropolitan areas, in the North East, and in the West --
wherehousing prices rose most during the late seventies and early
eighties -- thisincome gap is largest; in non-metropolitan areas and in
the South -- areasless affected by housing market pressures -- itis
reversed. Elderly parents with an existing family home owned free and
clear seem to provide an increasing amount of housing for the younger
generation. Hence, this development may be a supply effect on the part
of the elderly and a demand effect on the part of the younger genera-
tion.
This finding would also indicate that the supply elasticity for
shared accommodations is positive because those parent who are "host"
for the younger generation appear to be wealthier than average. In-16-
general, we may distinguish two contradictory hypotheses about the supp-
ly elasticity for shared housing. In addition to the hypothesis that
only a wealthy nucleus can afford being a "host" for another nucleus
(positive income elasticity of supply), it may also be reasoned that
only poor nuclei will offer to share accommodations with other nuclei,
since in this way they can save on housing costs by splitting them with
the "guest" nucleus (negative income elasticity of supply).
Table 5 sheds some light on this question. It tabulates the income
of the head nucleus by living arrangement of each nucleus. Hence,
columns referring to head nuclei (labelled INDEP or ending in -H) are
identical to Table 3, whereas columns referring to subfainilies (labels
ending with -S) now indicate the income of the respective head nucleus.
For distant relatives and non-relatives living with each other, in-
comes are roughly comparable (the yearly averages for these living
arrange-ments are based on cells with 25 to 150 observations and carry
large standard deviations). Income of both host and guest nucleus are
markedly lower than average. In these cases, the distinction between
supply and demand for shared living arrangements may be as artificial as
the distinction between head nuclei and subfamilies, and we observe the
in general declining tendency to double up when income is increasing.
The situation is quite different among elderly parent-adult
children households. If elderly parents live in the same household as
their children, and the children are head of the household, then the
children have a markedly higher income ($20,140, third row of Table 5,
roughly corresponding to the income in the second column in Table 4, its-17-
mirror-image) than the average income of young nuclei ($15,450).
Conversely, if elderly parents head a two-generation household, they
earn more than the average elderly nucleus ($13,020 versus $11,150).
This pattern is true in all of the four census regions and in
metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas alike. This finding rejects the
hypothesis of a negative income elasticity of supply of living
arrangements when two-generation households are concerned.
Stated differently, economic considerations such as saving housing
costs may well play a role when distantly related or unrelated nuclei
double-up. Not only the demand, but also the supply elasticity declines
with income. Among two-generation households, the mechanisms that
create two-generation households seem more complicated. Income clearly
indicates which nucleus plays the headship role and its ability to host
another nucleus. The data includes elderly parents who provide housing
for adult children constrained by the housing affordability crisis in
the late seventies and early eighties, and we observe adult children
with above average income who receive their elderly parents. To study
the economic incentives in these two-generation households more
carefully, we would need to know the elderly parents' health status.
Tables 6 through 9 present the main demographic determinants of the
choice among living arrangements: age, nucleus size, and sex of nucleus
head, relevant mostly for single-elderly nuclei.8
81f the nucleus consists of a married couple,age refers to the
average age of husband and spouse. Sex of nucleus head is a somewhat
ambiguous concept because the head of a nucleus is only well defined in
the trivial case of one-person nuclei or self-reported in one-nuclei
households. Otherwise, we assigned the head status to the male.-18-
The right margin of Table 6 reflects the aging of the American
population. Average age increased from 69.2 years to 69.8 years in the
decade considered. It is important to realize that this change is more
pronounced in the category of elderly who live independently. Once
again, this points out the increasing burden of social support and
health care that has to be born by society at large rather than the
immediate family. Table 7 displays the corresponding age profile: only
after age 75 does the proportion of elderly Americans living
independently decline and is picked by living arrangements within the
immediate or more distant family.
The columns in Table 6 represent the relation between multi-nuclei
living arrangements and age. Subfamilies tend to be older than head
nuclei, a finding, that may be explained by the health status of older,
therefore more dependent nuclei. In the case of elderly parents living
in the home of their adult children, the age of the parent nucleus is
particularly high (76.8 years).9 This relates back to the discussion of
the role of income in forming two-generation households and the
importance of the elderly parent's health status in that decision.
Surprising, however, is the fact that elderly parents who head a
joint household with their adult children are not only younger than
average nuclei, but also became even more so in the time from 1974 to
1983. It is interesting to relate this finding to the ownership rates
9A table similar to Table 5 indicates that the corresponding age of
the receiving child nucleus is quite young (52.8 years).-19-
in Table 10. These ownership rates represent the percentage of nuclei
who live in a dwelling that is owned by the head nucleus rather than
rented. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 10 show that the ownership rates of a
two-generation family home are virtually unchanged in our sample period.
However, the proportion of family homes owned by the elderly parent
increases, whereas the proportion of homes owned by the younger
generation declines.
Furthermore, the age profiles in column 2 and 3 of Table 7 show the
reversal of roles with increasing age, the crucial age being 75 years
after which more elderly become subfamilies rather than heads and at
which the rate of independently living elderly nuclei peaks. Except for
the small category of NREL-S, the attractiveness of all other living
arrangements also strongly declines after the age of 75. In passing,
note the low ownership rates of living arrangements among non-relatives.
All age patterns exhibit little variation across regions and degree of
urbanization, see Table 6.
Tables 8 and 9 shed more light on the demographic characteristics
of living arrangements, in particular two-generation households.
Elderly living in the household headed by their adult children are
almost always single and mostly female, whereas elderly parents who are
heads in a two-generation household are more often but by no means
exclusively couples. Living arrangements with non-relatives are most
frequently chosen by single male elderly persons, particularly in the
midwestern region of the United States.-20-
5. A Multinomial Logit Model of the Choice Among Living
Arrangeiients
Thedescriptive analysis in the previous Section pointed out some
important changes in the way elderly Americans live. In addition to the
intergenerational shift in ownership patterns among two-generation
households, the most striking change is the unexpectedly large increase
in the proportion of elderly Americans living independently as opposed
to the reversal of headship rates in the younger population.
What factors are generating the difference in household formation!
dissolution patterns between the elderly and the young? There are
primarily two hypotheses. The first hypothesis could be termed the
"inertia hypothesis." Low mobility, caused by relatively higher
monetary and non-monetary moving costs for the elderly, creates aslow
adaptation of housing patterns to a changing economic environment among
the elderly. Market forces that may induce trends in the general market
will only very slowly shift consumption patterns of the elderly. With
an increasing share of the population becoming elderly, the proportion
of elderly living independently among all households will rise. A
relatively decreasing "supply" of younger households because of the
change in the age distribution will also increase the proportionof
elderly living independently among all elderly nuclei.
The second hypothesis -- wewill term it "income distribution
hypothesis" -- restson the observation that the economic environment
has actually changed much less for the elderly than for the younger-21-
population. Whereas real income rose in in the seventies and then
sharply declined in the beginning of the eighties for younger families,
this was not the case for the elderly. The same holds for housing
prices. Housing prices were rising drastically in the beginning of the
eighties, but most elderly were already sitting in houses owned free and
clear that have appreciated during that period but without a
proportional increase in cash-costs.
In order to distinguish between both hypotheses, we need to
estimate the price and income elasticities of the proportions in which
living arrangements are chosen, as well as contrast these elasticities
with the influence of demographic variables. We will estimate a variant
of the multinomial logit model describing the choice among the seven
alternative living arrangements introduced in Section 3 and depicted
below in Figure 1.
We consider the most frequent choice of living independently as the
base category and measure the attractiveness of the remaining six
choices relative to this category. We postulate that the attractiveness
or (dis-) utility of each alternative relative to living independently
can be decomposed into three additive components. The first component
describes the (dis-)utility of sharing accommodations either as head of
the joint household (denoted by HEAD) or as subfamily (denoted by SUBF).
The second component describes the attractiveness of the partners, that
is the (dis-)utility an elderly nucleus receives from living with
distant relatives (denoted by DREL) or with unrelated persons (denoted
by NREL). Living as elderly parents with its own adult children
(denoted by PARE) serves as the base category for shared living
arrangements.-22-
These utility components are a deterministic function v of regional
housing prices (denoted by PRI), nucleus income (INC), age of nucleus
members (AGE), the size of the nucleus (PER), and the sex of the nucleus
head (SEX), comprised in the vector X. In addition, a random utility
component ej represents all unmeasurable factors that characterizeeach
















We assume that the are mutually independent and logistically
distributed and specify functions v linear in the explanatory variables.
Hence, the probability of choosing the alternative with the highest
attractiveness is of the familiar multinomial logit form.1°
Several comments are appropriate concerning the choice of this
model. First, all explanatory variables are nucleus-, but not
alternative-specific. An alternative model commonly used in this
situation is the logit model with alternative-specific coefficients
where for each relative utility component
10McFadden (1973).-23-
(2) u -UINDEP X'fli +€,i=l,..,6or PARE-H,. .,NREL-S.
Our specification simply economizes on the number of parameters by
imposing a set of linear restrictions on the
(3)
-2
- andl - -
Inaddition, these restrictions reflect a non-hierarchical pattern of
similarities among the alternatives.
This leads to the second comment. It would be desirable to allow
for a more flexible specification of the distribution of the unobserved
utility components e. Excluding a general multivariate normal
distribution because of its computational intractability, an obvious
choice is the generalized extreme value distribution leading to the
nested niultinomial logit (NMNL) model. However, the NMNL model is not
identified in the context of explanatory variables that do not vary
across alternatives 11
A final comment regards the nature of the data. The data includes
repeated observations of the same nucleus, but treats each observation
independently. This assumption requires that all nucleus-specific time-
invariant utility components are included in the explanatory variables.
We are well aware that if in fact the unobserved characteristics
There is no variation in the inclusive values to ide:tiy the
dissimilarity parameters.-24-
correlate over time, the logit model will produce inconsistent
estimates. It is possible to correct for this potential inconsistency
by conditioning on the time-invariant unobserved nucleus characteristics
(Chamberlain, 1980). However, with 9 cross-sections, this approach is
prohibitively costly. Little is known about the magnitude of this bias
in the coefficients.12 The longitudinal nature of the data will also
the deflate the standard errors. Assuming essentially unbiased
estimates, the correct standard errors should be approximately twice as
large as reported)3
Table 1]. presents parameter estimates of the choice model. The
estimates are based on a choice-based subsample of all 19,154 nuclei.
The subsample includes all nuclei that live with non-relatives, a .05
percent random sample of independent nuclei, and intermediate sized
random samples of nuclei in other living arrangements. The subsample
includes 3,081 nuclei and substantially economizes the estimation, at
the same time including a sufficiently large number of observations for
each living arrangement to guarantee reliable estimation results. To
correct for the case-controlled or choice-based subsampling, the
estimation procedure re-weights each observation. The weights (the
ratio of the percentage of each alternative in the original sample over
the percentage in the subsample) vary by income class and cross-section.
12See BOrsch-Supan and Pollakowski (1985) for an application and
sensitivity analysis using a panel of 3 cross-sections.
l3 3081 observations in the estimation sample represent between
700 and 800 differnt nuclei.-25-
The estimation approach is a slight generalization of the WESML
estimator proposed by Manski and Lerman (1977)14.
A striking result in Table 11 is the predominance of demographic
variables relative to economic determinants. The coefficients measuring
housing prices are insignificant, the income elasticities surprisingly
small. In contrast, age, nucleus size, and sex of single person nuclei
determine most of the observed variation in choices among living
arrangements. The overall fit, measured as ratio of optimal over
diffuse likelihood value, is quite satisfactory.
We will first discuss the age variables. Nucleus age refers to the
average age of nucleus head and spouse, its sample mean is about 70
years.' To be able to capture the important differences in housing
choices before and after age 75 discovered in Table 7, we include age
linearly (measured in years) as well as quadratically (measured in
squared years divided by 100). The probability of living as a subfamily
increases with old age, correspondingly, headship rates decline.
However, at ages below 75 years, becoming one year older still decreases
the log-odds of being a subfamily rather than living independently. The
probabilities of the HEAD alternatives decline uniformly in the relevant
age range, whereas the tendency to move as elderly parent in the home
14See McFadden, Winston, and BOrsch-Supan (1985) for details, in-
cluding a derivation of the appropriate asymptotic covariance matrix.
The WESML estimation approach is not necessary to consistently estimate
the coefficients in the MNL model. Inclusion of alternative specific
constants would serve the same purpose. However, these constants are
highly collinear with PER and FEM which makes the WESML approach more
attractive.-26-
headed by the adult child increases steadily. All these patterns
correspond to simple intuition and the tabulations in Section 4. We
will compute these predicted age profiles in more detail further below.
The variable PER or PERSONS represents the number of persons in the
nucleus, therefore also the marital status of its head (PER=l, if the
elderly person is widowed, divorced or never married, in generalPER=2
otherwise15). Not surprisingly, elderly couples strongly prefer to live
independently. If they share housing, they prefer to head the joint
household, other things being equal. They regard doubling-up with non-
relatives as a strongly inferior alternative. The odds of preferring
such a living arrangement are about twelve times lower than for single
elderly.
The variable FEM or FEMALE indicates that the head of the nucleus
is female which is relevant for one-person nuclei. After correcting for
differences in income and age between single male and single female
elderly, male are much more likely to live together with non-related
persons in one household, their odds of choosing thisalternative being
3.6 times higher than among female persons.
Of the economic variables, PRI or PRICE denotes a housing price
index of owner-occupied housing computed by Brown and Yinger (1986).
The index represents after-tax user-cost of a typical single-family home
and includes historical appreciation as well as the federal income tax
15There are some cases of elderly nuclei with own children under
age 18.-27-
advantages of homeownership for the relevant income range. Because of
the very large ownership rates, an owner-oriented price index seems to
be the most appropriate index of housing costs for the elderly. The
index is computed from Annual Housing Survey tabulations. The index is
not SMSA-specific and varies only by the four Census regions Northeast,
Midwest, South, and West. However, regional and intertemporal price
variation is very large because the second half of our the sample period
encompasses the rapid rise in housing costs, starting in the West, then
picking up in the remainder of the United States. In spite of this
dramatic change in housing prices, virtually no price effect can be
found in our estimation.
The variable INC or INCOME represents the nucleus' current income,
measured in $1000 per year deflated by the Consumer Price Index with
base year 1980. Its sample mean is about 10.0. The estimated
coefficients indicate a precisely measured, but surprisingly small
income effect in favor of living independently. The log-odds ratio of
choosing to live as a subfamily rather than independently decreases by
.1061 for an income increase of $1000. At first sight, these results
seem to reject the "income distribution hypothesis" in favor of the
notion that housing consumption of the elderly is very inert. Even if
the income of the elderly had declined as much as in the general
population, the lack of responsiveness of household dissolution
decisions to income changes would have predicted an essentially
unchanged housing consumption pattern.
Because the author of the paper is an economist, not a demographer,
the paper would have ended at this point. However, believing in-28-
economics after all, we re-estimated the model in twodifferentways.
First, the sample was stratified into three income classes and each
income class estimated separately. Second, the pooled cross-sections
are decomposed into an early sample period (1974-76), a middle period
(1977-79), and a late period (1980-83).
Table 12 presents the results stratified by income class. The
lower income class extends to $5,000 per year, and the upper income
class begins with a yearly income in excess of $10,000.
Quite clearly, there are very strong differences between the income
classes. The statistical hypothesis that the estimated relationships
are homogenous with respect to income class can easily be rejected.16
Whereas the coefficients for housing prices and demographic variables
are essentially stable, most of this difference can be found in the
income variable. Low income nuclei are highly income responsive, about
five times as much as was estimated in the pooled regression in Table
11. Income responses among the other two income groups are essentially
insignificant, while a perverse sign characterizes the middle income
group)7 Low income elderly comprise almost half of the sample (1404
out of 3081). Hence, the aggregation error in Table 11 is considerable,
and we will use this disaggregate model for the applications in Section
6 below.
16The likelihood ratio test statistic is 188.2 (the loglikelihood
of the constrained estimation is 3159.5 (Table 11), the likelihood of
the unconstrained model (Table 12) is 3065.4). The chi-squared value
for 50 degrees of freedom at .99 confidence is 76.2.
i7 that the reported standard errors ignore intertemporal cor-
relations. Correct standard errors are approximately twice as large.-29-
The result of high income elasticitiesamong the poor elderly
corresponds to earlier findings that predicted very elastic household
formation rates for single elderly women participating in a general
housing allowances program)-8 It also revives the hypothesis that
without double-indexation of Social Security income the United States
may have experienced a much larger incidence of doubling-up among the
elderly than was actually the case. For more affluent elderly, economic
considerations appear to be irrelevant in the decision among living
arrangements.
We performed a second sample stratification in order to investigate
whether tastes have changed from 1974 to 1983 and re-estimated the model
separately for the periods 1974-76, 1977-79, and 1980-83. This
decomposition also alleviates the econometric problems of pooling cross-
sections in the presence of unobserved nucleus-specific but time-
invariant utility components. Estimated coefficients are presented in
Table 13. The results are qualitatively unchanged from Table 11, and
the likelihood ratio test version of the Chow-test is insignificant. If
at all, the income elasticities show a rising tendency, both in terms of
magnitude and significance. The stability of the results is a fair
indication that the potential inconsistency of the logit results may not
be a severe problem in this data set.
18Borsch-Supan (1986).-30-
6. Simulations andApplicationsof the Model
What do the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients imply? How do
living arrangement decisions vary by age and income? Are the estimated
income effects sufficiently large to explain the discrepancy between
declining headship rates among young nuclei and a rising proportion of
elderly living independently in the early eighties? We will try to
answer these questions by evaluating predicted choice probabilities
generated by the niultinomial logit models in Table 12 in various
scenarios.
Table 14 presents predicted age profiles for the three income
classes. Clearly, poorer elderly not only have a lower tendency to live
independently but also give up this status earlier than elderly with
higher incomes. The reversal in the choice probability of living
independently occurs at 70.5 years for elderly nuclei with yearly
incomes below $5,000, at 75.5 years for the middle income group, and at
78.5 years for those elderly nuclei who receive more than $10,000
yearly.
Once they dissolve their households, the upper income classes are
more likely to be received by their adult children or by more distant
relatives. The pattern is different for poorer elderly among whom a
large proportion stays head of a two-generation household. As opposed
to the low income strata, elderly nuclei with incomes above $5,000
become increasingly likely to also be received by distant or unrelated
persons. However, this trend is statistically insignificant.-31-
Which living arrangements would elderly Americans have chosen in
the absence of the rise in real income generated by Social Security
indexation? Table 15 presents estimated changes that would have occurred
if the income of elderly nuclei had exhibited a similar development as
the income of younger nuclei. Using the observed income at 1974, we
computed the hypothetical elderly's income by using an income index
calculated from the sample of young nuclei. Columns 1 and 3 display the
changes between this and the baseline prediction, once for nuclei with
income below $5,000 and once for all nuclei. The differences are
substantial for poor nuclei, but there not large enough to explain a
similar decrease in headship rates among all elderly as was observed
among young nuclei. This is indicated in columns 2, 4, and 5, which
compare the yearly changes in the proportion of elderly living
independently with the actual changes in this category among the young
nuclei.
We conclude that the divergence in the income development
substantially contributed to the steady increase in the proportion of
elderly living independently, but that this explanation in itself is not
sufficient to account for the entire discrepancy in choosing living
arrangements between young and elderly Americans.
7. SummaryofConclusions
1. About a third of all nuclei with at least one elderly person do
not live independently. As opposed to an increase in the proportion of-32-
doubled-up households in the general population in the early eighties,
this percentage has fallen among elderly Americans.
2. The emerging discrepancy in living arrangement choices between
young and elderly can only partially be explained by the discrepancyin
the income development 1974 to 1983. The residual may be attributed to
inertia due to low mobility and slow adaptation to economic changes.
3. More than 17 percent of all elderly nuclei live with their
adult children. In most of these cases, the parents head the common
household. If the children are household heads, the parent is mostly
single, old, and has only a small income.
4. Within these two-generation households, important
intergenerational changes occurred from 1974 to 1983. An increasing
percentage of these households are headed by the parent generation
rather than the adult child. We speculate that this development can be
attributed to the housing affordability crisis among young first time
home buyers.
5. Few elderly live with distant relatives (the proportion is less
than 9 percent), and very few elderly share the household with non-
relatives (about 3 percent).
6. The choice probabilities among living arrangements are
predominantly determined by demographic variables. There is no
evidence, that they respond to an aggregate price index of owner-
occupied housing.-33-
7. The "demand elasticity for shared accommodations" with respect
to income is strongly negative for elderly with low incomes. However,
for elderly nuclei with yearly incomes in excess of $5,000, the income
elasticity is insignificant after correcting for demographic variables.
8.In elderly parents-adult children household, there is some
evidence that the corresponding "supply elasticity for shared
accommodations" with respect to income is positive: children who
"receive" their parents have about twice than average nucleus income.-34-
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INDEP PARE-HDREL-H NREL-HPARE-SDREL-SNREL-STable 1: OBSERVED FREQUENCIES OF LIVING ARRANGEMENTS
(Percentages of Elderly Nuclei)
YEAR INDEP PARE-H PARE-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
1974 69.311.4 6.4 5.0 4.8 1.9 1.2 100.0
1975 70.411.8 5.9 4.6 4.4 1.8 1.2 100.0
1976 70.511.8 6.1 4.8 3.9 1.6 1.2 100.0
1977 70.5 12.4 5.7 4.9 3.9 1.5 1.1 100.0
1978 71.5 11.7 5.4 5.0 3.5 1.4 1.4 100.0
1979 71.5 11.2 5.3 4.9 3.9 1.5 1.6 100.0
1980 71.3 11.8 4.8 5.0 3.9 1.7 1.5 100.0
1981 71.5 12.5 4.1 4.4 4.3 1.9 1.4 100.0
1983 73.012.3 4.5 4.4 3.0 1.8 1.1 100.0
71.111.9 5.4 4.8 3.9 1.7 1.3 100.0
REGIONINDEP PARE-H PARE-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
NO-EAST64.613.8 6.7 6.1 5.2 1.8 1.7 100.0
MIDWEST74.5 9.3 5.0 4.3 3.5 2.0 1.4 100.0
SOUTH 71.013.2 4.9 5.1 4.0 1.0 .7 100.0
WEST 74.8 10.5 5.0 2.9 2.7 2.4 1.7 100.0
71.111.9 5.4 4.8 3.9 1.7 1.3 100.0
URBAN INDEP PARE-H PARE-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
SMSA 68.512.7 6.3 5.1 3.9 2.0 1.4 100.0
NON-SMSA 75.010.5 3.8 4.3 3.9 1.2 1.1 100.0
71.111.9 5.4 4.8 3.9 1.7 1.3 100.0Table 2: OBSERVED FREOUENCIES OF LIVING ARRANGEMENTS
(Percentages of Young Nuclei)
YEAR INDEP pARE.HaCHILH Cl-IlL-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
1974 55.713.5 1.720.0 3.3 3.7 1.0 1.7 100.0
1975 55.213.3 1.519.9 3.9 4.3 .9 1.5 100.0
1976 55.5 12.6 1.919.4 4.2 4.5 .9 1.5 100.0
1977 55.312.5 1.419.5 4.0 5.1 1.2 1.7 100.0
1978 54.512.4 .920.0 4.0 4.9 1.7 2.6 100.0
1979 55.312.1 .820.1 4.4 5.0 1.2 1.7 100.0
1980 54.112.0 .919.2 4.7 5.5 1.7 2.8 100.0
1981 53.411.4 1.019.9 4.9 5.9 1.8 2.8 100.0
1983 52.412.9 1.020.8 4.4 5.1 1.8 2.5 100.0
53.912.6 1.219.8 4.2 4.9 1.3 2.1 100.0
REGIONINDEP pAREHaCHILH CHIL-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
NO-EAST50.214.2 1.923.8 3.4 3.8 1.4 1.9 100.0
MIDWEST53.512.4 1.320.8 4.7 5.3 1.0 1.5 100.0
SOUTH 57.412.3 .919.2 3.6 4.4 1.3 1.9 100.0
WEST 56.511.3 1.115.2 5.3 6.4 1.8 3.3 100.0
53.512.6 1.219.8 4.2 4.9 1.3 2.1 100.0
URBAN INDEP pARE.HaCHILH CHIL-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
SMSA 52.012.8 1.420.8 4.5 5.4 1.5 2.4 100.0
NON-SMSA 59.812.1 .917.9 3.5 3.8 1.1 1.5 100.0
53.512.6 1.219.8 4.2 4.9 1.3 2.1 100.0
Note: a About .4 percent nuclei in PARE-S are included in PARE-H.Table 3: INCOME OF NUCLEI BY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS
(Elderly Nuclei; Hundred 1980 Dollars)
YEAR INDEP PARE-H PARE-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
1974 113.6 115.452.695.554.7 105.8 1.3 104.7
1975 114.5 111.452.3 102.244.9 119.7 .0 105.6
1976 116.6 119.7 55.382.152.6 110.6 1.4 107.6
1977 118.2 115.7 54.096.159.4 104.235.2 109.8
1978 120.2 131.146.291.553.296.648.7 112.3
1979 116.9 128.749.371.852.682.765.9 108.6
1980 116.2 141.945.889.150.5 121.948.6 111.0
1981 128.1 155.048.088.444.989.751.5 121.1
1983 128.3 152.754.2 102.452.891.378.3 123.4
119.1 130.251.190.951.7 102.938.3 111.5
REGIONINDEP PARE-H PARE-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
NO-EAST 123.2 148.741.8 104.559.0 103.656.8 115.3
MIDWEST 111.8 119.357.191.745.691.525.8 105.0
SOUTH 110.6 109.6 50.072.948.999.232.6 102.4
WEST 141.3 161.861.7 111.252.4 120.131.8 133.9
119.1 130.251.190.951.7 102.938.3 111.5
URBAN INDEP PARE-H PARE-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
SMSA 129.3148.950.798.650.7 115.034.5 120.5
NON-SMSA 104.7 95.052.176.953.272.646.297.4
119.1 130.251.190.951.7 102.938.3 111.5Table 4: INCOME OF NUCLEI BY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS
(Young Nuclei; Hundred 1980 Dollars)
YEAR INDEpa CHIL-H CHIL-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
1974 191.1 184.635.9 136.023.4 124.411.9 148.3
1975 198.0 214.140.0 142.725.1 120.9 7.6 153.6
1976 200.2 237.038.7 132.931.0 104.710.2 155.2
1977 198.2 209.137.1 158.580.5 109.153.2 155.9
1978 201.2 238.143.4 158.376.9 139.759.1 157.5
1979 204.7 155.445.5 141.676.2 141.575.0 160.1
1980 202.7 148.041.8 140.478.9 139.859.3 156.5
1981 205.7 186.937.5 122.267.9 147.467.0 155.0
1983 197.1 174.631.8 136.170.9 123.456.3 148.5
199.7 199.139.1 140.961.1 130.148.1 154.5
REGIONINDEpa CHIL-H CHIL-S DRE8-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
NO-EAST 192.8 215.442.6 158.669.6 133.753.0 148.2
MIDWEST 204.7 187.841.5 139.658.9 132.547.9 156.6
SOUTH 186.6 182.936.9 134.256.9 121.455.8 147.1
WEST 221.5 210.932.8 137.863.5 135.438.1 170.5
199.7 199.139.1 140.961.1 130.148.1 154.5
URBAN INDEpaCHIL-H CHIL-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
SMSA 209.4 212.238.6 149.265.3 138.147.8 158.5
NON-SMSA 182.3 159.840.4 119.149.3 108.149.0 146.6
199.7 199.139.1 140.961.1 130.148.1 154.5
Note: a INDEP category includes PARE-H category.Table 5: INCOME OF HEAD BY LIVING ARRANGEMENT OF NUCLEUS
(Head Nuclei of Elderly Nuclei; Thousand 1980 Dollars)
YEAR INDEP PARE-H PARE-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
1974 113.6 115.4 179.795.5 102.8 105.8 151.9 116.9
1975 114.5 111.4 210.4 102.2 106.4 119.784.2 118.5
1976 116.6 119.7 220.082.195.8 110.664.8 120.1
1977 118.2 115.7 226.596.1 106.1 104.266.4 121.7
1978 120.2 131.1 217.891.597.796.662.4 123.4
1979 116.9 128.7 189.571.890.182.780.6 117.7
1980 1l62 141.9 202.989.1 100.1 121.994.5 121.2
1981 128.1 155.0 198.688.497.389.792.3 130.1
1983 128.3 152.7 162.2 102.4 113.091.385.3 130.1
119.1 130.2 201.490.9 100.9 102.986.5 122.1
REGIONINDEP PARE-H PARE-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
NO-EAST 123.2 148.7 207.4 104.585.7 103.6 109.6 128.7
MIDWEST 111.8 119.3 197.691.7 107.491.563.5 114.7
SOUTH 110.6 109.6 188.172.996.399.269.5 111.4
WEST 141.3 161.8 221.5 111.2 142.9 120.196.7 145.4
119.1 130.2 201.490.9 100.9 102.986.5 122.1
URBAN INDEP PARE-H PARE-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
SMSA 129.3 148.9 215.298.6 108.7 115.092.1 134.0
NON-SMSA 104.795.0 166.176.988.772.674.9 103.5
--
119.1130.2 201.490.9 100.9 102.986.5 122.1Table 6: AVERAGE AGE OF NUCLEI BY LIVING ARRANGEMENT
(Elderly Nuclei; Years)

















URBAN INDEPPARE-H PARE-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-HNREL-S
SMSA 69.266.077.068.072.170.371.169.4
NON-SMSA 69.466.976.569.672.467.571.969.5
69.366.376.868.572.269.571.369.5Table 7: FREQUENCY OF LIVING ARRANGEMENTS BY AGE
(Percentage of Elderly Nuclei)
AGE INDEP PARE-H PARE-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
<65 68.321.9 1.1 5.1
--
1.9 1.0 .7100.0
66-70 72.812.2 2.8 5.1 3.7 2.2 1.2100.0
71-75 77.9 6.5 3.2 5.1 3.6 2.4 1.2100.0
76-80 74.1 5.5 8.2 4.7 4.1 1.4 1.9100.0
>80 58.9 8.818.1 3.1 8.0 1.1 2.0 100.0Table 8: SIZE OF NUCLEUS BY LIVING ARRANGEMENT
(Elderly Nuclei; Number of Persons)






1975 1.6 1.7 1.1 1.5 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.5
1976 1.5 1.7 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.5
1977 1.5 1.7 1.1 1.5 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.5
1978 1.5 1.7 1.0 1.5 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.5
1979 1.5 1.7 1.1 1.5 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.5
1980 1.5 1.7 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.5
1981 1.5 1.7 1.0 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.5
1983 1.5 1.7 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.5
1.5 1.7 1.0 1.5 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.5Table 9: SEX OF NUCLEUS-HEAD BY LIVING ARRANGEMENT
(Elderly Nuclei; Percent Female)
YEAR INDEPPARE-H PARE-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
1974 38.637.179.7 38.966.747.652.042.7
1975 38.436.377.642.8 73.155.238.542.5

































71.179.484.679.973.563.061.273.0Table 11: MULTINOMIAL LOCIT ESTIMATES OF LIVING ARRANGEMENT CHOICES
VARIABLE UTILITY COMPONENT ESTIMATESTD.ERROR T-STATISTIC
PRICE SUBFAMILY -.0185 .0266 -.69
PRICE HEAD -.0043 .0233 -.18
PRICE DISTANT RELATIVE .0274 .0212 1.29
PRICE NON-RELATIVE .0197 .0262 .75
INCOME SUBFAMILY -.1061 .0177 -5.97
INCOME HEAD -.0013 .0044 -.31
INCOME DISTANT RELATIVE -.0421 .0079 -5.27
INCOME NON-RELATIVE -.0208 .0095 -2.17
AGE SUBFAMILY -.0300 .0125 -2.39
AGE SQ. SUBFAMILY .0521 .0126 4.11
AGE HEAD -.0691 .0124 -5.53
AGE SQ.HEAD .0374 .0138 2.70
AGE DISTANT RELATIVE .0616 .0121 5.07
AGE SQ.DISTANT RELATIVE -.0671 .0124 -5.40
AGE NON-RELATIVE .1136 .0137 8.24
AGE SQ.NON-RELATIVE -.1144 .0145 -7.89
PERSONSSUBFAMILY -1.8548 .2159 -8.58
PERSONSHEAD .6145 .1433 4.28
PERSONSDISTANT RELATIVE -.7961 .1826 -4.35
PERSONSNON-RELATIVE -2.5076 .2248 -11.15
FEMALE SUBFAMILY -.0075 .1607 -.04
FEMALE HEAD .4760 .1732 2.74
FEMALE DISTANT RELATIVE -.4730 .1543 -3.06
FEMALE NON-RELATIVE -1.2829 .1497 -8.56
LOGLIKELIHOOD AT OPTIMUM: -3159.5
LOGLIKELIHOOD AT ZERO: -5995.3
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS: 3081
Notes: Estimates are obtained by weighted exogenous sampling maximum
likelihood. Standard errors are not corrected for intertemporal
correlation.Table 12: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES AFTER INCOME STRATIFICATION
INCOME ￿ $5,000: $5,000 -$10,000: INCOME > $10,000:























































































































































874Table 13: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES FOR THREE TIME PERIODS

























Notes: See Table 11.











































-2.04 -.0143 -.66 -.0365-1.52
3.22 .0399 1.81 .0464 2.03
-3.82 -.0779-3.46 -.0401-1.77
2.22 .0509 1.99 .0073 .31
2.61 .0520 2.74 .0585 2.80
-3.19 -.0577-2.72 -.0612-2.91
5.19 .0868 3.38 .1216 4.81



















































1008Table 14: HOUSEHOLD DISSOLUTION OF ELDERLY AMERICANS BY AGE AND INCOME
Nuclei with Income ￿ S5.000:





80: 69.112.27.66.03.7 .8 .5
85: 67.613.29.55.03.6 .6 .4
90: 65.214.612.04.13.4 .4 .3
95: 61.916.314.93.4 3.1 .2 .2
Nucleiwith Income S5.000 -$10.000:
AGEINDEP PARE-H PARE-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
60: 73.212.3 1.6 8.6 1.1 2.8 .4
65: 76.210.9 2.1 6.8 1.3 2.3 .4
70: 78.3 9.8 2.8 5.3 1.5 1.8 .5
75: 79.2 8.9 4.2 4.0 1.9 1.3 .6
80: 78.5 8.1 6.4 2.9 2.3 1.0 .8
85: 75.7 7.310.4 2.0 2.9 .7 1.0
90: 69.5 6.417.4 1.4 3.7 .4 1.2
95: 58.9 5.428.9 .8 4.4 .3 1.4
Nuclei with Income >$lO.000:
AGEINDEP PARE-H PARE-S DREL-H DREL-S NREL-H NREL-S
60: 73.616.9 .7 6.8 .3 1.6 .1
65: 79.612.6 1.1 4.9 .4 1.4 .1
70: 84.3 8.9 1.7 3.2 .6 1.1 .2
75: 87.3 6.0 2.7 1.9 .9 .8 .4
80: 87.93.84.71.11.3 .6 .7
85: 85.32.28.2 .52.0 .41.4
90: 78.2 1.214.7 .2 2.8 .2 2.6
95: 65.1 .625.4 .1 3.9 .1 4.8
Note: All predictions are based on the disaggregate model in Table 12.Table 15: PREDICTED PROPORTIONS OF NUCLEI LIVING INDEPENDENTLY
IF INCOME OF ELDERLYHADDEVELOPED AS GENERAL INCOME
(Changes;PercentagePoints)
LOWINCOMEELDERLY: ALL ELDERLYNUCLEI: YOUNG NUCLEI:
predictedpredicted predicted predicted actual
change change change change change
versus versus versus versus Versus
baselineprev.year baselineprev.year prev.year
1974 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
1975 -1.1 -.9 -.4 -.3 -.5
1976 -1.2 .3 -.4 .1 .3
1977 -1.3 .2 -.4 .1 -.2
1978 -.8 1.0 -.2 .3 -.8
1979 -.6 -.5 -.2 -.2 .8
1980 -2.2 -1.2 -.7 -.4 -1.2
1981 -3.6 .3 -1.1 .1 -.7
1983 -4.8 -.7 -1.4 -.2 -1.0
Notes: The entries in columns 1 and 3 represent the difference between
baseline prediction (using the elderly's actual income) and alter-
native prediction (deflating the elderly's income at the rate of the
general income development). The entries in columns 2 and 4
represent the yearly changes of the alternative prediction.
Column 5 represents the yearly changes of the actual proportions
among young nuclei (Table 2). All predictions are based on the
disaggregate model in Table 12.